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CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES

Paul C. Giannelli
Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
The witnesses' credibility or worthiness of belief is
an important factor in most criminal trials. In some
trials, it is the only issue; once the jury has decided
which witnesses are credible and which are not, the
question of guilt or innocence is easily reached. The
common law, supplemented by various statutory
enactments, has spawned numerous rules regulating
the introduction of evidence of credibility. This article
examines those rules.
Typically, lawyers associate "credibility" with "impeachment" - attempts to diminish credibility. There
are, however, important evidentiary rules regulating
attempts to support credibility. For example, Ohio has
rules governing "bolstering," attempts to support credibility prior to attack, as well as rules governing "rehabilitation," attempts to support credibility after attack. Thus, credibility may be viewed in three stages:
bolstering, impeachment, and rehabilitation.
BOLSTERING
Generally, a party may not bolster or support the
credibility of its witness until that credibility has been
impeached. For example, a witness' favorable reputation for truth and veracity is not admissible in the absence of an attack.
It is the general rule that a party cannot bolster his witnesses by proving either specific
instances of good character relative to truth
and veracity or by demonstrating the witness'
good general character and reputation for
truth and veracity in the community before the
witness is affirmatively impeached by the opposing party. State v. Schecter, 47 Ohio App.
2d 113, 120-21, 352 N.E. 2d 617, 624 (1974),
aff'd, 44 Ohio St. 2d 188, 339 N.E. 2d 654
(1975).
Similarly, prior consistent statements are inadmissible
prior to attack. Ct. Cincinnati Traction Co. v.
Stephens, 75 Ohio St. 171, 79 N.E. 235 (1906). (Even
after attack such statements are not automatically
admissible.)

Two exceptions to the bolstering prohibition are
especially important in criminal cases. First, a witness'
in-court identification may be bolstered or corroborated by evidence of a prior out-of-court identification,
whether it be a lineup, show up, or photographic display. State v. Lancaster, 25 Ohio St. 2d 83, 267 N.E.
2d 291 (1971 ). Such corroborating testimony may be
elicited from the eyewitness or from a third party who
observed the identification. The prior identification is
admissible only for bolstering purposes. The hearsay
rule prohibits the substantive use of this evidence.
Thus, a third party cannot testify about an out-of-court
identification unless an in-court identification has first
been made by the eyewitness. This evidentiary rule
does not, of course, affect the constitutional requirements relating to the admissibility of pretrial identifications. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (right
to counsel); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98
(1977) (due process).
The second exception concerns evidence of fresh
complaint in rape and other sex offense trials. In an
early case, Dunn v. State, 45 Ohio St. 249, 12 N.E.
826 (1887), the Court held that once the alleged victim
has been sworn and has testified, her declarations in relation to the injury, made immediately after it was inflicted, would be competent in corroboration of her statements
made in court ... [Such complaints] are assumed to be the natural outburst of outraged
feelings, and, if made at all, would naturally
be made at the first opportunity, while the injury is yet fresh and aggravating. /d. at
250-52, 12 N.E. at 828.
Accord, McCombs v. State, 8 Ohio St. 643 (1858);
Johnson v. State, 17 Ohio 593 {1848). Again, evidence of fresh complaint is admitted to bolster credibility and is otherwise hearsay. /d. There are few recent cases on fresh complaint, probably because
most fresh complaints would also fall within a hearsay
exception, either spontaneous exclamations or res
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gestae, and would thus be admitted substantively.
Nevertheless, there may be situations in which the
complaint is delayed and thus would not fall within the
hearsay exception, but would qualify under the bolstering rule because a "sufficient explanation" for the
delay is offered. See State v. Crissman, 31 Ohio App.
2d 170, 287 N.E. 2d 642 (1971 ).

Furthermore, proposed Ohio Rule of Evidence 607
would abolish the voucher rule. 51 Ohio B. 191
(1978}. Even if the Rules are never accepted by the
General Assembly, the Court retains the power to
modify the common law by decision, and proposed
Rule 607 is evidence of the Court's inclination to do
so.

IMPEACHMENT: THE VOUCHER RULE
Ohio follows the traditional view of prohibiting a
party from impeaching its own witnesses. State v.
Minneker, 27 Ohio St. 2d 155, 271 N.E. 2d 821
(1971 ). The rule is based upon the theory that
"[w]here a party calls a witness for examination he
presents such witness to the court and jury as one
whose testimony is to be relied upon ... " Thompson
v. Kerr, 39 Ohio L. Abs. 113,120,51 N.E. 2d 742,747
(1942). This rationale is not persuasive because "except in a few instances such as character witnesses
· or expert witnesses, the party has little or no choice of
witnesses. He calls only those who happen to have
observed the particular facts in controversy." C.
McCormick, Evidence 75 (2d ed. 1972).
There are several limitations on the voucher rule.
Tl:le rule does not apply when the method of impeachment is specific contradiction; that is, when a
second witness contradicts the testimony of a prior
witness. State Auto Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Friedman, 34
Ohio App. 551, 171 N,E. 419 (1929), aff'd, 122 Ohio
St. 334, 171 N.E 591 (1930).
.. The rule also does not apply if a party is "surprised"
by !he witness' testimony. See State v. Springer, 165
Ohio St. 182,134 N.E. 2d 150 (1956);Hurley v. State,
46 Ohio St. 320, 21 N.E. 645 (1888}; State v. Johnson, 1120hio App. 124, 165 N.E. 2d 814 (1960). Apparently there is a limitation on the surprise· rule. If
·surprised, a party·may use a prior inconsistent statemenfonly to refresh the witness' recollection. State v.
Minneker, 27 Ohio St. 2d 155, 271 N.E. 2d 821
(1971 ). Thus, while technically not permitting impeachment, the effect of the surprise rule is impeachment (not refreshment), if the witness refuses to
repudiate the in-court testimony.
The voucher rule also does not apply to court~called
witnesses. Since the court, and not the parties, calls
the witness, neither party has "vouched" for the witness' credibility. The Supreme Court has recently rec- ·
ognized the trial judge's power to call witnesses. See
State v. Weind, 50 Ohio St. 2d 224, 235-36, 364 N.E.
. .
2d 224, 233 (1977).
The validity of the voucher rule operating to prevent
a criminal defendant from impeaching a witness is
constitutionally suspect. In Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284 (1973), the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the combined effect of the state's voucher rule
and hearsay exception on declarations against penal
interests precluded the admission of critical and reliable defense evidence and thus violated due process.
The Court's language leaves little doubt that in the
appropriate case the voucher rule itself would violate
due process: "The 'voucher' rule, as applied in this
case, plainly interfered with Chambers' right to defend
against the State's charges." /d. at 298.

IMPEACHMENT: liNES OF ATTACK
There are generally four lines of attack available to
impeach:
1. Bias or interest.
2. Contradiction, either specific contradiction or
self-contradiction. The former involves the use of
another witness to contradict, while the latter involves the use of the witness' own statements to
contradict (prior inconsistent statements).
3. Character for truth and veracity. There are several ways to prove character, not all of which are
recognized in Ohio: reputation, opinion, prior
conviction, and specific acts not resulting in a
conviction.
4. Sensory or mental defects.
At common law, a person's lack of belief in a Supreme Being disqualified the person as a witness. Article I, Section 7 of the Ohio Constitution prohibits the
use of religious beliefs as a grounds for disqualification. The use of religious beliefs as an impeachment
method is also improper. See State v. Barger, 111
Ohio St. 448, 453, 145 N.E. 857, 858 (1924); proposed Ohio R. of Evid. 61 0; Fed. R. Evid. 61 0; C.
McCormick, Evidence§ 48 (2d ed. 1972}; 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ~ 61 0[01]
(1977}.
Impeachment evidence may be developed either
(1) on cross-examination or (2) through extrinsic evidence, testimonial or documentary. Some impeachment techniques condition the admissibility of extrinsic
evidence on the laying of a proper foundation during
cross-examination. Other techniques prohibit the use
of extrinsic evidence. Courts typically address this
1
issue in \f~rms of_ "collateral matters," although the
term is ra~ely defined. Extrinsic evidence on collateral
matters is not permitted.
BIAS OR INTEREST
Bias as an impeachment technique has long been
recognized in Ohio. R.C. 2945.42 provides: "Such interest, ... or relationship may be shown for the purpose of affecting the credibility of such witness." See
also Powell v. Powell, 78 Ohio St. 331, 85 N.E. 541
(1908); A/him v. State, 10 Ohio St. 287 (1859).
There are two broad categories of bias: (1) relationships between a witness and one of the parties, and
(2) relationships between a witness and the litigation.
A witness' relationship with one of the parties may be
favorable, such as family, employment, business, and
sexual relationships, or it may be hostile, thus creating
a motive for revenge. The most important relationship
between a witness and the litigation is a case in which
a prosecution witness is offered immunity or a reduced charge in exchange for his testimony against
the defendant. Such arrangements are always admis-

2

~
~

111

'«

sibfe to show bias. See State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St.
traditional view of requiring a foundation as a prere2d 167, 249 N.E. 2d 912 (1969}; Keveney v. State,
quisite for admitting the prior statement.
109 Ohio St. 64, 141 N.E. 845 (1923).
.Before a witness can be contradicted by proving statements out of court at var:ance ·with
Evidence of bias or interest is never "collateral;"
his testimony, he must first be inquired of,
therefore extrinsic evidence is always admissible to ·
upon cross-examination; as to such stateshow bias. See Harper v. State, 106 Ohio St 481,
ments, and the. time, place and person in140 N.E. 364 (1922). Moreover, curtailment of a
volved in the supposed contradiction. King v.
defendant's efforts· to establish bias is unconstituWicks, 20 Ohio 87 (1851) (syllabus).
tional. In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974}, the
defense attempted to show that a key prosecution
Accord, Kent v. State, 42 Ohio St. 426 (1884); Radke
witness was a juvenile probationer and therefore had
v. State, 107 Ohio St. 399, 140 N.E. 586 (1923). In
a motive - retention of his probationary status - to
State· v. Osborne, 50 Ohio St. 2d 211, 364 N.E. 2d
testify in a way favorable to the prosecution. The trial
216 {1977), the Ohio Supr~me Court recently held
judge, based on a state statute, excluded the evithat a sufficient foundation had been laid by questions
dence. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, finding a
· attempting to refresh the witness' recollection about
violation of the defendant's right to confrontation.
the prior statement. Whether Ohio follows the rule in
Chief Justice Burger observed:
Queen Caroline's case is a matter of dispute.
Compare R. Markus, Trial Handbook for Ohio
The State's policy interest in protecting the
Lawyers 124 ( 1973), with Staff Notes, Proposed Ohio
confidentiality of a juvenile offender's record
R. Evid. 613. Queen Caroline's rule requires a prior
cannot require yielding of so vital a constituwrittenstatement to be shown to the witness as part
. · tiona! right as the effective cross-examination
of the foundation. Proposed Ohio Rule 613 would
for bias of an adverse witness./d. at 320. ·
abolish this ruie. See 51 Ohio B. 195 (1978}.
See also Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968); Alford
Procedural Aspects. Once an inconsistent statev. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931 ).
·
merit is introduced, the witness is entitled to an opporPRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
. tunity to explain the apparent inconsistency, Runyan
Substantive Evidence. Ohio follows the traditional
v. Price, 15 Ohio St. 1 (1864), and the opposing
view in admitting prior inconsistent statements only for
counsel has the right to inspect the writing, Bluestein
impeachment. Under this view, the prior statement is
v. Thompson, 102 Ohio App. 157, 139 N.E. 2d 668
offered to show. the inconsistency. between the wit(1957). If the witness admits making the prior state- ·
ness' trial and pretrial statements, and not to show the
ment, it is not error for the trial court to refuse to admit
truth of the assertions contained in 'the pretrial statethe statement into evidence. Babbitt v. Say, 120 Ohio
ment If offered tor the fatter purpose, the statement
St.177, 165 N.E. 721 (1929);Dietsch v. Mayberry, 70
would be hearsay. McKelvey Co. v. General Casualty
Ohio App. 527,47 N.E. 2d 404 (1942). It is also probCo., 166 Ohio St.. 401, 142 N.E. 2d 854 (1957};
ably not error for the trial court to admit the statement.
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. McCune, 46 Ohio
In Dorsten v. Lawrence, 20 Ohio App. 2d 297, 253
App. 291, 188 N.E. 568 (1933).
N.E. 2d 804 (1969), the court held that "after a proper
·Inconsistency Requirement. To be admissible the
foundation for impeachment has been laid for the inprior statement must be inconsistent with the witness'
troduction of inconsistent statements of a witness, it
trial testimony. The Ohio cases have adopted a liberal
becomes necessary to prove them." /d. at 305, 253
view of the inconsistency requirement. If the prior
N.E. 2d at 810.
statement can be interpreted in either of two ways,
Collateral Matters. In addition to a proper foundaonly one of which is inconsistent with the trial testion, the prior statement must not relate to a "collattimony, the statement is admissible.
eral matter." If the statement does relate to a collat[If the prior statement] is susceptible of differeral matter; extrinsic evidence is not permitted.
ent meanings, one of which would be inconByomin v. Alvis, 169 Ohio St. 395, 159 N.E. 2d 897
sistent with the truth of such testimony, it is
{1959); Kent v. State, 42 Ohio St. 426 (1884 ); Clinton
admissible in evidence, leaving the jury to dev. State, 33 Ohio St. 27 (1877). The collateral matter
termine which is the true meaning ... Dilcher
rule only applies to extrinsic evidence; it does not prev. State, 39 Ohio St. 130 (1883).
clude inquiry on cross-examination so long as the inIf the witness' testimony includes material facts that
quiry is relevant to impeachment. The tests for collatwere omitted in the prior statement, the statement is
eral matters and relevancy are not synonymous. AI~
inconsistent. Spaulding v. Toledo Consolidated St.
though the early cases cite Attorney-Genera/ v. HitchRy. Co., 20 Ohio Cir. Ct. 99 (1900). Moreover, if the
cock, 154 Eng. Rep. 38 (1847}, as the test for collatwitness claims a lack of memory or knowledge at trial,
eral matters, it is probably accurate to say that the test
the prior statement is inconsistent. Blackford v. Kapfor collateral matters in Ohio is not well-defined. For a
lan, 135 Ohio St. 268, 20 N.E. 2d 522 (1939) (excludiscussion of this issue, see C. McCormick, Evidence
sion of prior statement when witness testified "I don't
§ 36 (2d ed. 1972); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
know," "I don't remember," or "I don't believe so" is
Weinstein's Evidence 'If 607[06] (1977).
erroneous}. Criminal Rule 16 provides for the inspecConstitutional Issues. In Harris v. New York, 401
tion of prior statements after the witness has testified
· U;S. 222 (1971), the U.S. Supreme Court held that
on direct examination.
statements obtained· in violation of the Miranda
requirements could nevertheless be used for imFoundation Requirement. Ohio also follows the

The use of opinion evidence to prove character, on
peachm~nt. The Court r~affirmed and perhaps exthe other hand, is prohibited. Bucklin v. State, supra;
tendedHarris in Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714
Cowan v. Kinney, supra. The general prohibition of
(1 975). See also State v. Lancaster, 25 Ohio St. 2d
opinion evidence has been criticized by the commen83, 267 N:E .. 2d ~91 (1 971 ).
tators. See 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1986 (3q ed.
Ohio ~lso recognizes impeachment by prior incon1940); C. McCormick, Evidence § 44 (2d ed. 1972).
sistent qCts. See Dilcher v. State, 39 Ohio St. 130,
Proposed Ohio Rule 608(A), following the Fecferal
13§ (1883) ("ConduCt inconsistent with the testimony
Rules of Evidence, would permit opinion evide(1ce to
of a witness, may be shown as well as former stateprove charaCter. See 51. Ohio B. 191 (i 978).
'
ments thus inconsistent.") The U.S. Supreme Court
has Cllso had occasion to consider the application of
Character: Proof by Prior Conviction
Miranda and Harris to this method of impeachment In
· Prior convictions are admitted .to impeach on the
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the Court held
- theory that a conviction evidences a defect of ch-arac~
. thatthe·impeachme_nt us~ of Cl defendant's po~t~arr~st .
ter i:fna a person with such a charaCter defect is more
S!l¢nq~ (conduCt) after receiving Miranda warnings
likely tobe untruthful than a person without such a
VIolated dlle process.
. .·
.
~-character; defect. The theory has· obvious flaws. A
. . C~lfi.r~~tir f:vide~c~~ - --·- ·- .
conviction for "driving whiie under the influence" reveals
very little about a person's character for verac1he Ohio cases have recognized that a witness'
ity,
although
it. may reveal other things about that
character is relevant for impeachment purposes. See
person's
character.
Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme
·Bucklin v; State, 20 Ohio 18 (1851); French v. Millard,
Court in interpreting R.C. 2945.42, has held that any
2 Ohio St. 45 (1853); Cowan v: Kinney, 33 Ohio St.
conviction; misd13meanor. or· felony, is admissible for
,122.(1878). Only the witness: charact~r for truth and
impeachment purposes. State v. Murdock, 172 Ohio
veraCitY. and not his general character; is relevant.
St.
221, 174 N.E. 2d 543 (1961 ). The Court has also
Schueler v. Lynam, 80 Ohio App. 325, 75 N.E. 2d 464
held, however, that an ordinance violation is not a
(1947): ·In this context, character is used circumstan"crime" within the meaning of R.C. 2945,42 and thus
tiaHy:
cannot
be used to impeach. $tate v. Arrington, · 42
The theoiyunderlying the use of evidence of
OhioSt.-2d
H4~ 326 N.E. 2d 667- (1975);-Harpeiv. ·
.· ''character or conduct forimpeathmenfpurState, 106 Ohio·st. 481,140 N.E. 364 (1922);Coble ·
. ·•· poses is that a person who possesses certain
v. State, 31 Ohio St. 100 {1876). Proposed Ohio Rule
_inadequate character traits- as evidenced in
of Evidence. 609 suggests that the Court may be willa variety of ways including that he acted in a
ing to limit Murdock. Under Rule 609(A) mis·particular way- is more prm1e than a person
demeanors
would only be admissible if they involve
. ·whose character, in these. respects, is good,
"dishonesty
or false s.tatements." In addition, Rule
to testify untruthfully. It follow$ from this
· 609(B) would generally preclude the use of convic· --tiypefflesis that evidence Qf his bad character,
tions over 10 years old. See 51 Ohio B. 192 (1978).
· ·. or conduct is relevant to prove that he is lying.
Ohio has several expungement provisions,
Although
_ 3 J; Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's EviR.C. 2953.31-36, an expunged conviction niay
· · _ derice 608~8 {1977). ·
·
·
nevertheless be used for impeachment. R.C.
-.~character and reputation are not synonymous.
2953,$2{E).
"Character is a generalized description of one's disJl!venile fi:djudications. The use of juvenile adjudi..:
position, or of one's disposition in respect to a general
cat1ons
as Impeachment evidence is controlled by
· trait .. .'_' C. McCormick, Evidence 462 (2d ed. 1972).
R.C.
2151.358.
It provides:
· Reputation, on the other hand, is What a community
The
disposition
of a child under the judgment
collectively thinks about a person's character. Thus,
rendered or any, evidence given in court is not
reputation, along with opinion and specific acts, is a
admissible as evidence against the child in
way of proving character.
any other case or proceeding in any other
Character: Proof by Reputation.and
court, except that the judgment rendered and
OpinipnE:yidence
the disposition of such child may be consid· A witnes~:;: poor reputation for truth and veracity is
ered by any court only as to the matter of sentence or to the granting of probation.
a.dmissible for impeachment purposes. Cowan v.
Kenney, 33 Ohio St. 422 (1878); Bucklin v. State, 2o'
Thus, j~venlle adjudications are generally inadmissiOhio 18 (1851 ). The witness' reputation at the time of
ble for Impeachment. There is, however, one importrial is the critical period. Radkev. State, 107 Ohio St
tant exception. In State v. Cox, 42 Ohio St. 2d 200,
399', 140 N.E. 586 (1923). The offering party musllay
327 N.E;. 2d 6.39 (1975), the Supreme Court held that
a _foundation establishing· the. impeaching witness'
the statute could not prevent a defendant from iniqualifications to express an opinion about the reputa.
p-ead)ing a key government witness. .
tion in the community. Radke v. State, supra; State v.
Although the General Assembly may enact
Rivers, 50 Ohio App. 2d 129, 361 N.E. 2d 1363
legislation to effectuate its policy of protecting
(1977). The impeaching witness may also state
the confiden,tiality of juvenile record;;, such
whether he would believe the witness sought to be
· enactment ·may ncit impinge upon the right of
impeached under oath. Hillis v. Wylie, 26 Ohio St. 574
a defendant in a criminal case to present all
(1875).
available, relevant and probative evidence ·
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which is pertinent to a specific and material
aspect of his defense. !d. at 204, 327 N.E. 2d
at 642.
See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)
Uuvenile probationary status admissible to show bias
notwithstanding state statute). In addition to the impeachment exception recognized in Cox, the courts
have permitted evidence of juvenile adjudications to
be introduced to rebut evidence of good character.
See State v. Marinski, 139 Ohio St. 559, 41 N.E. 2d
387 (1942); State v. Hale, 21 Ohio App. 2d 207, 256
N.E. 2d 239 (1969).
Unconstitutional Convictions. In Loper v. Beta, 405
U.S. 473 (1 972), the u~s. Supreme Court held that
the impeachment use of a conviction in which the defendant was denied the right to counsel violated due
process. The right to counsel violation in Loper was
based upon Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963). Gideon was subsequently extended in
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). to any
criminal trial in which imprisonment is imposed. This is
an important development for a jurisdiction such as
. Ohio which permits the use of misdemeanor convictions. Once the validity of the prior conviction is
raised, the prosecution has the burden of establishing
that the right to counsel requirements were met. U.S.
v. Lewis, 486 F. 2d 217 (5th Cir. 1973).
·
Indictments and Arrests. Evidence that a witness
has been indicted or arrested may not be used to impeach if that evidence is offered only to show the witness' bad character. If, however, the impeachment
theory is bias, such evidence would be admissible.
See State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St. 2d 167, 249 N.E. 2d
912 (1969); Kaveney v. State, 109 Ohio St. 64, 141
N.E. 845 (1923).
.

·A witness can never be impeached through
evidence of specific instances of bad character whether related to truthfulness or otherwise. !d. at 121, 352 N.E. 2d at 624. . .
Its 1950 decision was not mentioned, in:stead ·the
court relied on Brice v. Samuels, 59 Ohio App. 9, 17
N.E. 2d 280 (1938), a 1938 decision by the Court of
Appeals for the First District. Brice held impeachment
by specific instances of conduct on cross-examination
improper:
[W]e know of no rule under which specific
acts of wrongdoing may be admitted to affect
the credibility of a witness. /d. at 14, 17 N.E.
2d at 282.
Authority for a different rule from the First District,
however, could have been found in State v. Browning, 98 Ohio App. 8, 128 N.E. 2d 173 (1 954), decid.ed
in 1954. In Browning the First District overturned a
conviction because the defensE) was not permitted to
impeach a prosecution witness through instances of
misconduct - episodes of drunkeness and false accusations:
Evidence of ... habits of sobriety ... associations in life, similar accusations, and general
habits in general could be quite pertinent as
reflecting on [the witness'] credibility ... /d. at
14, 128 N.E. 2d at 176.
Moreover, the impeachment technique in Browning
involved proof by extrinsic evidence as well as evidence developed on cross-examination. Thus, there
may be three different rules in Ohio: (1) specific instances of conduct are inadmissible - Brice and
Schecter; (2) specific instances of conduct may be
raised on cross-examination ___,. Fawick Airflex Co.;
and (3) specific instances may be proved by extrinsic
evidence as well as raised on cross-examination Browning. Proposed Ohio Rule of Evidence 608(8)
would permit specific instances to be raised oh
cross"examination under certain circumstances. See
51 Ohio 8; 191-92 (1 978).
The impeachment rule on specific acts not resulting
in a conviction should be distinguished from the rule
governing the use of character evidence on the
merits. A criminal defendant may introduce evidence
of his good character in order to show that a person
with such a character is unlikely to have committed
the charged offense. Once the defendant has
"opened the door," the prosecution may rebut by offering evidence of the defendant's bad character. The
prosecution, however, must generally use reputation
evidence to prove character. Specific instances of
conduct not resulting in a conviction are prohibited.
State v. Cochrane, 151 Ohio St. 128, 84 N.E. 2d 742
(1949). Prohibiting the use of specific acts in this context does not necessarily mean that they are prohibited in the impeachment context. Compare proposed
Ohio R. Evid. 405(A), with proposed Ohio R. Evid.
608(8). .

Character: Specific Acts Not
Resulting in a Conviction
A person's conduct will reveal rnany aspects of that
person's character. For example, a person who intentionally falsifies an income tax return, a welfare application, or some other document; has revealed something about his or her character for truth and veracity.
If they are convicted tor these acts, the conviction
may be used for impeachment. But may the act still
be used to show the witness' character tor truth and
veracity in the absence of a conviction? The Ohio
cases are unclear. In a 1950 case, Fawick Airt/ex Co.
v. United Elec., Radio & Machine Workers, 56 Ohio L.
Abs. 419, 92 N.E. 2d 431 (1950), the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth District observed:
It has long been the law of this state that a
witness on cross-examination may be asked
questions tending to disclose his own character and may be interrogated on specific acts
... in his past life if they have a legitimate
bearing upon his credit as a witness. /d. at
421, 92 N.E. 2d at 433.
In 1974, however, the same court declared in State v.
Schecter, 47 Ohio App. 2d 113, 352 N.E. 2d 617
(1974), aff'd, 44 Ohio St. 2d 188, 339 N.E. 2d 654
(1975):
.

Sensory or Mental Defects.
This last impeachment category is extremely broad.
Any deficiency of the senses, such as deaf-
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ness, or color blindness or defect of other
senses which would ~ubstantially lessen the
atJility to- perceive the facts which the witness
purports to have observed, should of course
be provable to attack the credibility ofthe witness, either upon cross-examination or by
producing other witnesses to prove the defect. C. McCormick, Evide·nce 93 (2d ed.
1972).
The following Ohio cases are illustrative: Morgan v.
State, 48 Ohio St. 371, 27 N.E. 710. (1891) (opportunity to observe); Village of Shelby v. Clagett, 46 Ohio
St. 549, 22 N,E . .407 (1889) (intelligence); Lee v.
State, 21 Ohio St. 151 (1871) (recollection); Stewart
v. State,, :If! (Jhio~02 (1850) (opportunity to observe);
· Johnsonv. Knipp, 36 Ohio App. 2d 218, 304 N.E. 2d
914 (1973) (intoxication); State v. Snell, 2 Ohio NP
55, 5 Ohio Dec. 670 (1893) (age). ·

If the method of attack involves evidence of a prio1
inconsistent statement, evidence of prior consistent
statements are generally inadmissible. The theory un·
derlying this rule is stated in Cincinnati Traction Co. v.
Stephens, 75 Ohio St. 171, 79 N.E. 235 (1906):
[Prior consistent statements] could not tend to
reha,bilitate the damaged reputation of the
witness for veracity, in any degree, to show
that the witness had repeated a hundred
times the later story which she now gave on
. the trial. The contradiction still would remain,
and it would remain unexplained, notwithstanding the fact of repetition. /d. at 182, 79
N.E. at 237.
If, however, the prior statement is offered to rebut a
charge of recent fabrication or improper influence, it
may be admissible. See .C. McCormick, Evidence 105
{2d ed. 1972); ct. proposed 0 hio R. Evid.
801 (0)(1 )(b). See a/so She/lock v. Klempay, 167 Ohio
St. 279, 148 N,E. 2d 57 (1958).

Impeachment: Expert Witnesses .
· An expert witness may be impeached by the same
methods used to impeach lay witnesses. E.g., Hoover
v. State, 91 Ohio St. 41,109 N.E. 626 (1914) (expert
impeached with prior inconsistent statement.) There
is, however, one method of impeachment that applies
only to expert Witnesses. A treatise recognized as a
standard authority may be used for impeachment purposes. See Piotrowski v. Corey Hospital, 172 Ohio St.
61, 173 N.E. 2d 355 (1961 ); Hal/worth v. Republic
Steel Corp;, 153 Ohio St. 349, 91 N.E. 2d 690 (1950);
. Lambert .v. Dally, 30 Ohio App: 2d 36, 281 N.E. 2d
857 (1972). The treatise is admissible only to test
c:r~dit:li!ity, Cincl Jtc<:tnnot be used svbstantively. In addition, there is language in the Hal/worth opinion
which would lirnit the use of learned treatises, even for
impeachment purposes, to treatises acknowledged as
standard works by the witness:
If Dr. Kramer denied that he had known about
this particular book, it is difficult to see how
his further cross-examination with regard to
the book would be proper at all. /d. at 356, 91
N.E. 2d at 694.
Propo'3ed Ohio Rule of Evidence 803(18), on the
other h(lhd, carves out a hearsay exception for
learned treatises as well as permits the reliability of
the treatise to be established "by the. testimony or
admission of the witness or by other expert testimony
.or by judicial notice." 51 Ohio B. 200 (1978).
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Motions in Limine
The growing importance of motions in limine is highlighted by the addition at a new section on the subject
in the 1978 pocket supplement to McCormick on Evidence. C. McCormick, Evidence 17 (1978 Supp. 2d
ed. 1972). See also State v. Spahr, 47 Ohio App. 2d
221, 353 N.E. 2d 624 (1976); Rothblatt & Leroy, The
Motion in Limine. iri Criminal Trials, 60 Ky. L.J. 611
(1972); Davis, Motions in Limine, 16 Clev-Marshall L.
Rev. 255 (1966).
Law RevieWs
Comment, Shifting the Burden of Proving SelfDefense - With Analysis of Related Ohio Law, 11
Akron L. Rev. 717 (1978); Liability of an Aider and
Abettor for Aggravated Murder in Ohio; State v. Lockett, 39 Ohio St. L.J. 214 (1978); Note, the Sixth
Amendment Right To Have Use Immunity Granted to
Defense Witnesses, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1266 (1978);
Note, Defendant v. Witness: Measuring Confrontation
and Compulsory Process Rights Against Statutory
Communication Privileges, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 935
(1978).

.

Rehabilitation
Once impeachment evidence has been introduced,
rebuttal evidence tending to rehabilitate the witness'
credibility may be admitted. The rebuttal evidence
must respond to the impeaching evidence.
. The rehabilitating facts must·meet a particular
method of impeachment with relative directness. The wall, attacked at.one point, may not
be fortified at another and distinct point. C.
McCormick, Evidence 103 (2d ed. 1972).
Once a witness' character for truth and veracity has
been attacked, evidence tending to show that the witness enjoys a good reputation for truth and veracity is
admissible. Webb v. State, 29 Ohio St. 351 (1876).

Silence as Impeachment
After _being .read his rights upon .arrest, the defend"
ant made several statements to the police; he then
refused to say more until he could talk to an attorney.
At the defendant's trial for attempted murder, the
prosecutor commented repeatedly on the defendant's
post-arrest silence. A strong curative instruction to the
jury was not given by the trial judge. The Court of Ap-
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peals held that ··1 aln accused cannot be held to waive
his Miranda nghts by beginning to speak.·· The
prosecutor s questions and comments were improper
and constituted plain error. State v. Bailey, No. 37534.
Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. App. (1978).

of the search and go so far beyond what is encompassed in the scope of the eavesdrop statute. that an ·
eavesdrop executed in this manner is an unreasonable search ... The Court held that no statute authorizes
such conduct. and Article Ill of the Constitution and
the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment
"prevent federal judicial and law enforcement officers
from authorizing or engaging in such conduct in the
absence of statutory authority ... U.S. v. Finazzo, 23
Crim. L. Rep. 2501 (6th Cir. 1978).

Theft Statute -Recidivist Provision
Defendant was convicted of grand theft under R.C.
2913.02 (B). That statute provides that a second theft
conviction may be treated as grand theft, regardless
of the value of the stolen property. At the time of trial,
the defendant was awaiting sentencing for a prior theft
offense. The Court of Appeals held that without a
judgment of conviction setting forth the plea, the verdict, and the sentence, signed by the judge and entered upon the journal of the court, there had been no
conviction within the meaning of the statute. Since
there was no prior theft conviction, defendant's motion
to reduce the charge against him to petty theft should
be granted. State v. Henderson, No. 37316,
Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. App. (1978).

Warrantless Search of Suitcase
A warrantless search of the defendants' suitcase,
located on the floor of their automobile, was made at
the time of arrest. The Eighth Circuit held that "an
individual's expectation of privacy in the contents of
luggage - which was established by the Supreme
Court in [U.S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977] - is
entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment
whether the luggage is located inside or outside the
automobile." The automobile exception to the warrant
requirement does not apply to the facts of this case.
Since the defendants were under arrest, a warrant
was required for a search of their luggage. No exigent
circumstances existed to waive this requirement.
Therefore, marijuana found in the suitcase must be
suppressed. U.S. v. Stevie, 23 Grim L. Rep. 2489 (8th
Cir. 1978).

Waiver of Pre-sentence Psychiatric Examination
During plea-bargaining, the defendant waived his
right to a pre-sentence psychiatric examination under
R.C. 2947.25. He was subsequently sentenced to the
penitentiary. The purpose of R.C. 2947.25, according
to the Court of Appeals, is to assist the trial court in
determining whether to sentence an offender to a
penal institution or to a hospital for treatment. "Neither
the defendant, his trial counsel, nor the court is competent to determine whether the accused is mentally
ill or deficient. . . . [T]he examination is part of the
sentencing process and may not be waived by the defendant or his counsel." Thus, the lack of psychiatric
examination invalidated the sentence. State v. Lee, 56
Ohio App. 2d 57 (1977).

Pretext Arrests
Police used outstanding traffic warrants as a pretext
to arrest a drug suspect. A subsequent search of his
car turned up a bag of marijuana. The Court stated
that "since a pretext arrest is per se illegal, evidence
obtained as a result of that arrest is inadmissible."
Thus, the marijuana should have been suppressed as
the fruit of an illegal arrest. State v. Hoven, 23 Grim.
L. Rep. 2464 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1978).

Validity of Guilty Plea
Under Ohio Grim. R. 11 (c)(2) a trial court must inquire as to whether a defendant voluntarily entered a
plea of guilty with an understanding of the nature of
the charge and of the consequences of his plea. Failure of the trial court to make these inquiries in full
compliance with Grim. R. 11 (c)(2) is reversible error.
State v. Hawk, 55 Ohio App. 2d 231 (1977).

Warrantless Electronic Eavesdropping
Although the warrantless electronic recording of a
conversation in which .one party has agreed to be
"bugged" is proper under the Fourth Amendment,
U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971 ), it violates the
Montana Constitution. "A state is free as a matter of
its own law to impose greater restrictions on police
activity than those that the United States Supreme
Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards." Article II, section 10, of the Montana
Constitution provides that the right of individual privacy "shall not be infringed without the showing of a
compelling state interest." Absent such showing, evidence acquired through electronic monitoring must be
suppressed. State v. Brackman, 23 Grim. L. Rev.
2487 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1978).

Motion for Acquittal
When a jury is unable to reach a verdict in a criminal trial, the court may grant a motion of acquittal. In
doing so, it should exercise judicial discretion, considering all matters which transpired during the trial and
any other factors which may have influenced the jury.
The court should also consider the probability that
other juries would also be unable to agree. State v.
Norwood, 55 Ohio Misc. 19 (1977).

Pretrial Incarceration Credit
Prior to his trial for murder and attempted armed
robbery, the defendant was incarcerated for six
months because of his inability to post bail. He was
sentenced to consecutive life and fifteen year sentences. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the
equal protection clause requires that time spent in
pretrial incarceration be credited to the time served on
a life sentence to· determine eligibility for parole.

Breaking and Entering for Eavesdropping
The Sixth Circuit disagreed with other federal circuits' interpretation of Title Ill. The Court rejected the
arguments that Title Ill impliedly authorizes break-ins
to install eavesdropping equipment, or that federal
judges have inherent power to authorize such breakins. Breaking and entering affects property and personal interests, and "so aggravate the circumstances
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Wilson v. State, 264 N. W. 2d 234 (Wis. 1978).

intentional and would affect probable cause. Franks v.
Delaware, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1 978). The California Supreme Court, interpreting its own constitution, has
reached a different result. Evidence should be suppressed whenever a false statement is deliberately included in the affidavit, whether or not the statement
was necessary to the finding of probable cause.
People v. Cook, 24 Grim. L. Rep. 2004 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
'1978).

Nondisclosure of Material Evidence
The defendant was tried and convicted of robbery.
The prosecution failed to disclose, upon the defense'E
request, that two of the state's eyewitnesses had ini·
tially misidentified one of the robbers. The Court held
that this information was material enough to raise a
reasonable doubt in the jury's minds, as to both the
witnesses' trial identification of the defendant and the
strength of the state's case. This nondisclosure of
material evidence denied defendant a fair trial. State
v. Falkins, 356 So. 2d 415 (La. 1978).

Stipulation May Require Rule 11 Inquiry
The defendant originally pled guilty, but his plea
was denied when the trial judge discovered that the
defendant was not satisifed with his counsel. Later,
after pleading not guilty, the defendant stipulated to
facts which were "tantamount to a guilty plea." On
appeal, the· Court held that when a defendant stipulates to facts which are in effect an admission of guilt,
the trial court must ensure that the defendant understands the consequences. However, since defendant
had been carefully questioned in a Rule 11 procedure
earlier in the trial, his appeal was denied. Glenn v.
U.S., 23 Grim. L. Rep. 2562 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

Prejudicial Remarks by Prosecutor
In his closing summation to the jury, the prosecuting
attorney expressed his own personal opinion about
the defendant's guilt. These remarks were found to be
prejudicial and may have denied the defendant a fair
trial. The statements could have constituted grounds
for a mistrial if defendant's counsel had objected. Defense counsel's failure to object amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, and therefore a new trial
was granted. Commonwealth v. Evans, 387 A.2d 854
(Pa. 1978).

Illegal Stop Taints Consent
Police officers stopped and detained the defendant
without probable cause. During his detention the defendant consented to a search of his car. As a result
the police discovered a quantity of marijuana. The
Court held that the marijuana should be suppressed
because the illegal stop and detention fatally tainted
the defendant's consent. State v. Wrightson, 23 Grim.
L. Rep. 255 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1978).

Severance
The trial court had been notified of a potential conflict between the two defendants. The conflict developed as the defendants presented their cases,
prejudicing both defendants. The Court of ·Appeals
held that when the rights of at least one of the defendants will be prejudiced by a joint trial and the trial
court has notice of the conflict, denial of a motion to
sever is prejudicial error. People v. Webb, 266 N.W
2d 483 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).

Victim's Character
The Connecticut Supreme Court has adopted the
majority rule that a homicide victim's violent character
may be used to support a self-defense claim that the
victim was the aggressor. The Court further held that
prior convictions for violent crimes could be used to
prove the victim's character. Such evidence may be
used even if the defendant knew nothing of the
victim's violent character at the time of the incident.
State v. Miranda, 24 Grim. L. Rep. 2008 (Conn. Sup.
Ct. 1978).

Speedy Trial
There was a twenty-two month delay between the
defendant's arrest and the preliminary hearing, and
another five-month delay between the hearing and
trial. None of the delay was attributable to the defendant. Moreover, he objected to every continuance
sought by the state, and made a timely assertion of
his right to a speedy trial. The burden is on the state
to show that any delay is justifiable. Defendant's failure to make an evidentiary showing of prejudice to his
defense does not destroy his claim. "Finding that his
claim was timely asserted, that the delay was inordinate, and that the delay was justified by no constitutionally sufficient reason, we hold that defendant was
denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial."
Fowlkes v. Commonwealth, 240 S.E. 2d 662 (Va.
1978).

Right to Confrontation of Experts
Defendant was denied his right of confrontation
when a medical report, in which five of six psychiatrists declared him "competent," was admitted into
evidence. Only two of the five doctors subsequently
testified at trial. "This was critical evidence of a testimonial nature, pertaining directly to appellant's ultimate 'guilt', that could, and should, have come viva
voice- from the mouths of the witnesses in court,
where, under the watchful eye of the jury, they could
have been cross examined .. ."Gregory v. State, 24
Grim. L. Rep. 2014 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).

False Affidavit
The U.S. Supreme Court has refused to suppress
evidence obtained through a search warrant issued
upon a false affidavit, unless the misstatements are
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